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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JADE ROSE MOODY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NOS. 43434 & 43435
ADA COUNTY NOS.
CR 2015-517 & CR 2015-2130
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In the first of these two consolidated cases, Jade Moody pled guilty to battery on
a law enforcement officer and was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with one
year fixed. In the second case, Ms. Moody pled guilty to grand theft and was sentenced
to a consecutive unified term of five years, with two years fixed, for an aggregate
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed. She contends the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate sentence in light of the mitigating factors
that exist in this case. She also contends the district court abused its discretion by
denying her motions pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for reduction of her
sentences.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While apparently under the influence of methamphetamine, Ms. Moody grabbed
a woman by her throat and allegedly banged her head against the wall. (Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”), pp.3-4, 25, 31.) During the investigation of the incident,
Ms. Moody kicked a police officer in the chest and legs and refused to submit to arrest.
(PSI, p.4.) Four days later, Ms. Moody was riding in a vehicle with the brother of the
owner of the vehicle and his girlfriend. (PSI, pp.4-5.) When the brother of the owner of
the vehicle exited the vehicle to use the restroom, Ms. Moody drove off in the vehicle
with the girlfriend, and was apprehended approximately four hours later in Oregon.
(PSI, pp.5, 64.)
In Case No. 2015-517, Ms. Moody was charged by complaint with felony battery
on a law enforcement officer, misdemeanor battery, and resisting or obstructing an
officer. (R., pp.7-9.) The complaint was amended to add a charge of misdemeanor
battery on a law enforcement officer. (R., pp.49-52.) Ms. Moody waived a preliminary
hearing and was bound over to the district court. (R., p.56.) The State then filed an
Information charging Ms. Moody with these same crimes. (R., pp.57-59.) Ms. Moody
entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant to which she agreed to plead
guilty to felony battery on a law enforcement officer. (R., pp.63-64; Tr. p.42, L.17 –
p.43, L.13.) The State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of five years, with two
years fixed, and to recommend that the sentence be suspended and that Ms. Moody be
placed on probation. (R., pp.63-64.)
In Case No. 2015-2130, Ms. Moody was charged by complaint with one count of
grand theft. (R., pp.332-33.) Ms. Moody waived a preliminary hearing and was bound
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over to the district court. (R., p.369.) The State then filed an Information charging
Ms. Moody with this same crime. (R., pp.370-71.) Ms. Moody entered into a plea
agreement with the State pursuant to which she agreed to plead guilty and the State
agreed to recommend a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and to
recommend that the sentence be suspended and Ms. Moody be placed on probation.
(R., pp.374-75.)
The two cases were handled together for further proceedings. (R., pp.69, 376.)
Ms. Moody pled guilty to felony battery on a law enforcement officer and grand theft.
(R., pp.65-66; Tr. p.65, Ls.1-6.) The court sentenced Ms. Moody to a unified sentence
of five years, with one year fixed, for battery on a law enforcement officer. (Tr., p.86,
Ls.1-7.) It sentenced Ms. Moody to a unified sentence of five years, with two years
fixed, for grand theft. (Tr., p.86, Ls.8-14.) The court ordered the sentences to run
consecutively. (Tr., p.86, Ls.14-16.) The judgments were entered on June 9, 2015.
(R., pp.73-76, 385-88.) Ms. Moody filed timely notices of appeal. (R., pp.78-81, 39497.)

On October 7, 2015, Ms. Moody filed two Rule 35 motions for reduction of

sentence, supported by multiple exhibits. (R., pp.88-325, 407-644.) The district court
denied Ms. Moody’s Rule 35 motions by orders dated October 16, 2015. (R., pp.32628, 645-47.) Ms. Moody’s appeals were consolidated on August 13, 2015. (R., p.2.)
ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms. Moody an
aggregate sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, in light of the mitigating
factors that exist?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Moody’s Rule 35
motions?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Ms. Moody An
Aggregate Sentence Of Ten Years, With Three Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating
Factors That Exist
Ms. Moody asserts that, given any view of the facts, her aggregate sentence of
ten years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where, as here, the sentence imposed
by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834
(2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)). “When a trial court
exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is
reasonableness.’”

Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).

“A

sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted). “When reviewing the reasonableness
of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having
regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of
the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
The most important factor for the Court to independently examine here is the
character of the offender. Ms. Moody was twenty-five years old when she committed
the instant offenses. (PSI, p.1.) She had no prior adult felony convictions. (PSI, p.31.)
She did, however, have an extensive juvenile record and a history of substance abuse
and mental health problems. (PSI, pp.12, 23-26.) Ms. Moody became involved with the
criminal justice system at the age of twelve and was charged three times with running
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away, in addition to other offenses. (PSI, p.12.) She had previously been diagnosed
with bipolar disorder, PTSD, borderline personality, ADHD, anxiety, and obsessive
compulsive disorder, and she had a history of mental health hospitalizations. (PSI,
pp.32, 159.) She had been homeless since 2013, and had lost parental rights to her
daughter. (PSI, pp.17, 19.) Ms. Moody was clearly in need of substance abuse and
mental health treatment, not a term of incarceration.
At sentencing, the prosecutor stated the State was “going to stick with the plea
agreement and recommend probation in this case.” (Tr., p.70, Ls.1-3.) Ms. Moody
stated she “hope[d] for probation.” (Tr., p.81, L.7.)

The presentence investigator

concluded Ms. Moody was “a good candidate for an order of retained jurisdiction” and
recommended screening for mental health court as an alternative. (PSI, p.33.) Despite
the recommendations of the State, Ms. Moody and the presentence investigator, the
district court neither suspended Ms. Moody’s sentence nor retained jurisdiction.
Instead, it imposed an aggregate sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.

It

appears that the court was extremely concerned about Ms. Moody’s juvenile history,
and questioned whether she could be successful on probation.
The district court asked the prosecutor whether the State was aware of
Ms. Moody’s juvenile history at the time it entered into the plea agreement. (Tr., p.70,
Ls.4-6.) The prosecutor stated he could not tell, but could not “say for sure that they
didn’t know about it.” (Tr., p.70, Ls.7-13.) The prosecutor then said, “I don’t think there’s
any question that she’s not ready for probation at this point.” (Tr., p.70, Ls.15-20.)
Counsel for Ms. Moody asked the court why it had inquired into whether the State was
aware of Ms. Moody’s juvenile history. (Tr., p.73, Ls.7-11.) The court responded, “The
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purpose of that inquiry was if the State had been aware of the juvenile history, I would
have been surprised by the State’s probation recommendation.” (Tr., p.73, Ls.12-15.)
The court’s statements at sentencing reveal that it sentenced Ms. Moody based in large
part on her juvenile history.
Ms. Moody committed battery on a law enforcement officer, but it appears that
she did so while high on methamphetamine, and her conduct may have stemmed from
her drug use and her PTSD. (PSI, p.4; Tr., p.61, Ls.11-24.) Ms. Moody also committed
grand theft, but the facts of the offense are not as egregious as they could have been.
Ms. Moody did not steal a car from a stranger, but instead drove off when the driver of
the car in which she was traveling exited the vehicle to use the bathroom. (PSI, p.5.)
There was a passenger in the vehicle with her at the time she was stopped (who initially
stated the vehicle was hers), and it is unclear what Ms. Moody’s intentions were with
respect to the vehicle. (PSI, p.5.). Ms. Moody never presented a threat to the public at
large and all of the facts warrant a sentence of probation or a period of retained
jurisdiction, not an aggregate sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Ms. Moody’s Rule 35 Motions
“A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court . . . and essentially is a plea for leniency
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.” State v.
Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). “The denial of a motion for modification of a
sentence will not be disturbed absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.”
Id.

In examining a district court’s denial of a motion for modification, this Court
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“examine[s] the probable duration of confinement in light of the nature of the crime, the
character of the offender and the objectives of sentencing, which are the protection of
society, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.” Id.
As discussed above, the district court was concerned with Ms. Moody’s juvenile
history at sentencing, and was concerned about whether Ms. Moody could be
successful on probation. The court’s concerns should have been put to rest by the
materials Ms. Moody submitted in support of her Rule 35 motion, which included
hundreds of pages of notes and lists and workbook pages evidencing Ms. Moody’s work
on her recovery. (R., pp.88-325, 407-644.) Ms. Moody also submitted a letter from
another inmate who stated that Ms. Moody “is doing wonderful” and “has changed.”
(R., pp.325, 644.)
The district court had entered an order for Ms. Moody to participate in a
substance abuse program and an active behavioral change program prior to
sentencing. (R., p.67.) Ms. Moody was not able to participate in these programs prior
to sentencing due to lack of funding.

(Tr., p.78, Ls.19-21.)

Thus, at the time of

sentencing, the court did not have any information about whether Ms. Moody could
succeed in programming. The court was concerned that she could not, and would not
be successful on probation. The court thus refused to suspend Ms. Moody’s sentence,
despite the recommendation of the State, and refused to retain jurisdiction, despite the
recommendation of the presentence investigator. At the time Ms. Moody submitted her
Rule 35 motion, it was clear that Ms. Moody could (and had) benefitted from
programming and could (and would) be successful on probation.
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In light of this

additional information, the district court abused its discretion in denying Ms. Moody’s
Rule 35 motions.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Moody respectfully requests that the Court suspend her sentences and place
her on probation. Alternatively, she requests that the Court reduce her sentences as it
deems appropriate or vacate her sentences and remand to the district court for
resentencing.
DATED this 4th day of January, 2016.

___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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